My knowledge of the Shah and the hostage crisis and I guess a lot of other historical stuff I enjoy thinking and talking about comes principally from a lifetime reading the Washington Post, New York Times, The Atlantic, The New Yorker and a bunch of books and attending a couple of college courses and watching/listening to W…
My knowledge of the Shah and the hostage crisis and I guess a lot of other historical stuff I enjoy thinking and talking about comes principally from a lifetime reading the Washington Post, New York Times, The Atlantic, The New Yorker and a bunch of books and attending a couple of college courses and watching/listening to Walter Concrete and Huntley/Brinkley and having friends and family who tended to be well-read politics junkies and liked to yak until the cows came home. I'll bet you had plenty of similar things going on in your life, too, and probably still do.
I always look closely at your LFAA comments, as I expect to learn something new, and I am never disappointed.
David I loved your reference to “David Concrete” [Cronkite]. A book on the ten worst journalist stories focuses on the myth that President Johnson said ‘When Cronkite said (after a post-Tet visit to Vietnam) that we were in a stalemate, this indicates that we had lost American support.’
There is no evidence that Johnson ever viewed this Cronkite broadcast. Indeed, it became part of mythology in a David Haberstram book. In late February SecDef McNamara left and Clark Clifford replaced him. Clifford asked the Pentagon what was our policy to win in Vietnam and found none. General Westmoreland was asking for another 200,000 troops.
Also, Gallup polls reflected a sharp downturn in American support for Vietnam. Personally, after my Congo ‘exploits,’ I was twice invited (March 1965 and then in 1967) to join him in Saigon. I twice refused. It was clear from my years in Egypt the difference between ‘communism’ and nationalism. In Congo I encountered Army folks who urged me to support ‘strategic hamlets’ there. Nonsense.
From my personal experience and from reading Robert Shaplen’s and Bernard Fall’s books there was ‘no light at the end of the tunnel.
About the time of the Cronkite post-Tet broadcast, Johnson was still giving his forceful stay-the-course in Vietnam speeches. His poor performance in the NH presidential poll together with Clark Clifford’s assessment doves tailed with his Wise Men’ confab in which these folks reversed their previous support for a go-for-broke Vietnam policy. By the end of March Johnson made the personal decision not to run for re-election.
Thus, the ‘Cronkite story’ was clearly a myth.
P. S. In October, 1964 State Under Secretary George Ball wrote a penetrating 75-page legal brief on Vietnam alternatives. He concluded that there was no ‘winning’ strategy. This report was closely held by five people.
Sam Adams was my CIA current intelligence counterpart. He was excellent! Then he moved to do Viet Cong order of battle. The more he dug the more he could prove that the military was underestimating the Viet Cong forces by at least 200,000 [which would render McNamara’s kill ratio analysis meaningless.] Westmoreland sought to block Sam’s assessments. Within CIA Sam found that the CIA director refused him permission to circulate his assessments outside of CIA.
Ultimately Sam was obliged to reign (in 1966?).A book ultimately was published on his professional experiences. So much for McNamara’s ‘clinical analysis.’ When McNamara gave a talk in Canada, he seemed to be experiencing a psychological crisis. He had been Johnson’s ‘bright boy.’ Ultimately he was permitted to resign and go to the World Bank.
I found McNamara’s subsequent ‘apologia’ unconvincing.
Keith, I, too, thought McNamara's 'apologia' was unconvincing. His statements of mea culpa seemed too little, too late, too desperate--desperate to try and clean up his image or salvage something positive for his posterity.
As an aside:
By your comments above, I'm reminded again of your vast and long-term experience in international relations and trade. I'd love to ask your opinion about assorted high-ranking figures. For example, General David Shoup, Commandant of the Marine Corps (appointed by Eisenhower and retained by Kennedy as an advisor) in the early 1960s when the Vietnam conflict became public. He refused to send Marines to Vietnam (in 1963, I believe) saying the war was wrong as it was for the purpose of exploiting the Vietnamese people. I believe Johnson silenced him, perhaps by forcing his resignation. I see Shoup as a very heroic figure, committed to honesty, integrity, the Marine Corps, and the U.S. Do you have any inside info on him or personal expperiences with him?
Heydon No recollection of General Shoup. I was serving in Congo in 1963 and my general news sources were limited. The Economist by air and an air edition of the European NYT (linked with Herald Tribune). When they arrived in a bunch, I would diligently line them up chronologically and not peek at the latest.
Thanks Keith.
My knowledge of the Shah and the hostage crisis and I guess a lot of other historical stuff I enjoy thinking and talking about comes principally from a lifetime reading the Washington Post, New York Times, The Atlantic, The New Yorker and a bunch of books and attending a couple of college courses and watching/listening to Walter Concrete and Huntley/Brinkley and having friends and family who tended to be well-read politics junkies and liked to yak until the cows came home. I'll bet you had plenty of similar things going on in your life, too, and probably still do.
I always look closely at your LFAA comments, as I expect to learn something new, and I am never disappointed.
David I loved your reference to “David Concrete” [Cronkite]. A book on the ten worst journalist stories focuses on the myth that President Johnson said ‘When Cronkite said (after a post-Tet visit to Vietnam) that we were in a stalemate, this indicates that we had lost American support.’
There is no evidence that Johnson ever viewed this Cronkite broadcast. Indeed, it became part of mythology in a David Haberstram book. In late February SecDef McNamara left and Clark Clifford replaced him. Clifford asked the Pentagon what was our policy to win in Vietnam and found none. General Westmoreland was asking for another 200,000 troops.
Also, Gallup polls reflected a sharp downturn in American support for Vietnam. Personally, after my Congo ‘exploits,’ I was twice invited (March 1965 and then in 1967) to join him in Saigon. I twice refused. It was clear from my years in Egypt the difference between ‘communism’ and nationalism. In Congo I encountered Army folks who urged me to support ‘strategic hamlets’ there. Nonsense.
From my personal experience and from reading Robert Shaplen’s and Bernard Fall’s books there was ‘no light at the end of the tunnel.
About the time of the Cronkite post-Tet broadcast, Johnson was still giving his forceful stay-the-course in Vietnam speeches. His poor performance in the NH presidential poll together with Clark Clifford’s assessment doves tailed with his Wise Men’ confab in which these folks reversed their previous support for a go-for-broke Vietnam policy. By the end of March Johnson made the personal decision not to run for re-election.
Thus, the ‘Cronkite story’ was clearly a myth.
P. S. In October, 1964 State Under Secretary George Ball wrote a penetrating 75-page legal brief on Vietnam alternatives. He concluded that there was no ‘winning’ strategy. This report was closely held by five people.
Sam Adams was my CIA current intelligence counterpart. He was excellent! Then he moved to do Viet Cong order of battle. The more he dug the more he could prove that the military was underestimating the Viet Cong forces by at least 200,000 [which would render McNamara’s kill ratio analysis meaningless.] Westmoreland sought to block Sam’s assessments. Within CIA Sam found that the CIA director refused him permission to circulate his assessments outside of CIA.
Ultimately Sam was obliged to reign (in 1966?).A book ultimately was published on his professional experiences. So much for McNamara’s ‘clinical analysis.’ When McNamara gave a talk in Canada, he seemed to be experiencing a psychological crisis. He had been Johnson’s ‘bright boy.’ Ultimately he was permitted to resign and go to the World Bank.
I found McNamara’s subsequent ‘apologia’ unconvincing.
Keith, I, too, thought McNamara's 'apologia' was unconvincing. His statements of mea culpa seemed too little, too late, too desperate--desperate to try and clean up his image or salvage something positive for his posterity.
As an aside:
By your comments above, I'm reminded again of your vast and long-term experience in international relations and trade. I'd love to ask your opinion about assorted high-ranking figures. For example, General David Shoup, Commandant of the Marine Corps (appointed by Eisenhower and retained by Kennedy as an advisor) in the early 1960s when the Vietnam conflict became public. He refused to send Marines to Vietnam (in 1963, I believe) saying the war was wrong as it was for the purpose of exploiting the Vietnamese people. I believe Johnson silenced him, perhaps by forcing his resignation. I see Shoup as a very heroic figure, committed to honesty, integrity, the Marine Corps, and the U.S. Do you have any inside info on him or personal expperiences with him?
Heydon No recollection of General Shoup. I was serving in Congo in 1963 and my general news sources were limited. The Economist by air and an air edition of the European NYT (linked with Herald Tribune). When they arrived in a bunch, I would diligently line them up chronologically and not peek at the latest.
Walter Concrete--LOL!!